ISSN 2277-2685

IJESR/April-June. 2026/ Vol-16/Issue-2/544-553

Mohammed Faizan Uddin *et. al.*, / International Journal of Engineering & Science Research

Full Length Article

Spam Detection for Smart Home IoT Devices Using Machine Learning: A Comprehensive Framework

Mohammed Faizan Uddin[1], Mohammed Farhan[2], Mohammed Faris Uddin Ansari[3], Mohammed Ikram Uddin[4] Mrs Mayuri R. Tone[5]

[1,2,3,4]BTech Students Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Lords Institute of Engineering and Technology, Hyderabad, India

[5]Assistant Professor Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Lords Institute of Engineering and Technology, Hyderabad, India

ufaizan9676@gmail.com, mohammedfarhan11234@gmail.com, marasheedkhan44@gmail.com, *mohdfarisuddinansari@gmail.com*, *mayuritone@lords.ac.in*

Accepted 20-04-2026

Abstract

This paper presents an intelligent spam detection framework for securing smart home Internet of Things (IoT) devices using machine learning. With the number of connected smart home devices exceeding 25 billion globally, network security against spam injection, unauthorized access, and anomalous device communications has become critically important. The proposed system analyzes IoT network traffic from the REFIT Smart Home dataset—1,664 records with 13 features encompassing source/destination addresses, device types, locations, operations, and timestamps—to classify communications as Normal (valid) or Spam. A four-stage preprocessing pipeline applies Label Encoding for 10 categorical features, Simple Imputation for missing values, Standard Scaling for normalization, and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce 11 features to 10 principal components capturing ≈98% of total variance. Five machine learning classifiers are systematically evaluated: Bagging Classifier with SVC base estimator (99.4% accuracy), Decision Tree with Gini criterion (99.4%), AdaBoost with 100 estimators (95.5%), Voting Classifier combining Logistic Regression, Random Forest, and Gaussian Naive Bayes (89.2%), and Gaussian Naive Bayes (89.2%). A Keras Sequential deep learning model (Input(10)→Dense(4,ReLU)→Dense(4,ReLU)→Dense(1,Sigmoid)) trained for 200 epochs with Adam optimizer provides complementary validation. Each model produces a spamicity score representing device trustworthiness. The Flask web application offers role-based access (admin for model management, user for predictions) with Docker containerization and an optional Next.js frontend. This article presents the mathematical foundations of all algorithms, the complete system architecture, algorithmic pseudocode, and thorough results analysis including comparative tables, PCA variance analysis, learning curve data, and cross-validation findings.

Keywords: *IoT Security, Spam Detection, Smart Home, Machine Learning, Bagging Classifier, Decision Tree, PCA, AdaBoost, Voting Classifier, Gaussian Naive Bayes, Flask, Deep Learning, REFIT Dataset, Spamicity Score*

1. Introduction

The Internet of Things (IoT) has transformed residential environments by embedding connectivity, sensing, and computation into everyday objects. Industry analysts project that globally connected IoT devices surpassed 25 billion by 2025, with smart home devices—thermostats, refrigerators, voice assistants, smart locks, lighting controllers—constituting a large and fast-growing segment. These devices continuously generate, transmit, and receive data, creating a rich but highly vulnerable digital substrate within homes. Unlike conventional computing devices, IoT endpoints operate under severe constraints: limited CPU, minimal RAM, restricted battery capacity, and often no built-in security mechanisms whatsoever. This resource-constrained nature makes them attractive targets for spam injection, denial-of-service flooding, unauthorized command injection, and coordinated botnet attacks such as the 2016 Mirai botnet which harnessed compromised IoT devices to launch record-breaking DDoS attacks.

Spam detection in smart home IoT networks goes far beyond traditional email spam filtering. It encompasses automated identification of machine-to-machine communications that deviate from expected device behaviour—unusual operation types, atypical source-destination pairs, anomalous sensor readings injected by compromised nodes. Rule-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) such as Snort and Suricata are fundamentally mismatched for this domain: they require manual signature creation, cannot adapt to zero-day attacks, and impose computational overhead incompatible with IoT gateway hardware. Machine

learning classification, by contrast, learns complex non-linear patterns from labelled traffic examples and generalises to previously unseen anomalies, making it the method of choice for scalable, adaptive IoT spam detection.

This paper makes the following principal contributions: (1) a complete four-stage preprocessing pipeline tailored for heterogeneous IoT categorical data; (2) mathematical derivations of all five classifier families deployed; (3) the concept of a spamicity score as a probability-based device trust metric; (4) a web-deployed, role-separated Flask application with Docker containerisation; and (5) a rigorous comparative evaluation—including cross-validation and learning curve analysis—on the REFIT Smart Home dataset.

1.1 Research Gap and Motivation

The global smart home market is projected to exceed $200 billion by 2026, yet the gap between academic IoT security research and practical, deployable solutions remains wide. Most research proposals stop at offline experimental evaluation; few provide complete end-to-end implementations covering data preprocessing, multi-algorithm comparison, web deployment, and containerisation accessible to non-expert users. This project bridges that gap by delivering a fully operational system where any administrator can upload a new dataset, trigger training across five algorithms, and immediately serve predictions to end users through a clean web interface—all without writing a line of code.

2. Literature Survey

Zhang et al. (2014) established the foundational IoT security taxonomy, identifying six threat categories—device, communication, network, data, application, and service—that collectively define the attack surface of heterogeneous IoT ecosystems and highlighted the inadequacy of perimeter-based defences. Dorri et al. (2017) proposed blockchain for IoT trust management but concluded that consensus overhead is incompatible with constrained devices, motivating lighter-weight ML alternatives. Bertino and Islam (2017) codified four critical requirements for IoT security solutions: minimal computational overhead, heterogeneity adaptability, scalability, and resilience—requirements that directly shaped the PCA dimensionality reduction and ensemble classifier choices in this project.

On the ML-for-security side, Zhang and Green (2015) demonstrated that ensemble methods—particularly Random Forest—achieve 97.8% DDoS detection accuracy with lower false-positive rates than individual classifiers, supporting bagging-based approaches. Buczak and Guven (2015) meta-analysed 50+ intrusion detection studies and found that ensemble classifiers consistently outperform individual models by 3–8% in accuracy for binary traffic classification, directly validating the Bagging and Voting strategies. Narudin et al. (2016) achieved 99.1% mobile malware detection with Bagging+Decision Tree on network features—the closest analogue to this project's 99.4% result on IoT traffic. Alsheikh et al. (2014) confirmed that supervised ensemble methods provide the best detection accuracy for labelled sensor network datasets, reinforcing the supervised classification approach taken here.

For feature engineering, Jolliffe (2011) provided the mathematical foundation for PCA as an orthogonal variance-maximising transformation; Guyon and Elisseeff (2003) demonstrated that appropriate dimensionality reduction improves accuracy by 5–15% while reducing training time by 30–60% on correlated feature sets—precisely the REFIT dataset's profile. Tan et al. (2013) validated Decision Trees for DoS detection at 98.7% accuracy with the lowest overhead of any tested classifier, consistent with this project's Decision Tree achieving 99.4% on IoT spam. Li et al. (2016) showed weighted AdaBoost at 96.3% on NSL-KDD, slightly above this project's 95.5%, with the difference attributable to dataset-specific label noise characteristics.

Table 1: Literature Survey Comparison

Author(s)	Year	Focus	Key Finding
Zhang et al.	2014	IoT Security Taxonomy	Six IoT threat categories; perimeter security inadequate
Dorri et al.	2017	Blockchain for IoT	Blockchain overhead incompatible with constrained devices
Bertino & Islam	2017	IoT Privacy/Security	4 requirements: minimal overhead, adaptability, scalability, resilience
Zhang & Green	2015	DDoS Detection ML	RF achieves 97.8%; ensembles outperform individuals
Buczak & Guven	2015	Cyber Security Mining	Ensembles outperform individual classifiers by 3–8%

Author(s)	Year	Focus	Key Finding
Narudin et al.	2016	Mobile Malware	Bagging + Decision Tree: 99.1% accuracy
Alsheikh et al.	2014	ML for WSN	Bagging/Boosting best for labelled WSN/IoT data
Tan et al.	2013	DoS in IoT	Decision Tree 98.7% with lowest computational overhead
Li et al.	2016	Hybrid AdaBoost IDS	Weighted AdaBoost 96.3% on NSL-KDD
Jolliffe	2011	PCA Theory	Orthogonal variance decomposition; dimensionality reduction
Guyon & Elisseeff	2003	Feature Selection	Dimensionality reduction: +5–15% accuracy, −30–60% training time
Kulkarni & Venayagamoorthy	2009	Neural Net for WSN	RNN achieves 94.7% anomaly detection in sensor networks
Branch et al.	2013	Outlier Detection WSN	Supervised classification beats unsupervised by 8–12%
Xiao et al.	2017	Cloud IoT Malware	Voting ensemble achieves 93.4% accuracy

3. Mathematical Foundations

3.1 Problem Formulation

Let $D = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^{n}$ be the preprocessed dataset of n records, where $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{10}$ is the 10-dimensional PCA-transformed feature vector and $y_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is the binary label (0 = valid, 1 = spam). The classification objective is to learn a function $f: \mathbb{R}^{10} \to \{0, 1\}$ minimising the expected 0-1 loss:

$$R(f) = E_{(x,y)\sim P}[\mathbb{1}(f(x) \neq y)]$$

Each classifier additionally outputs a spamicity score $S(x) \in [0, 1]$ representing the estimated probability of a communication being spam, enabling threshold-based alerting: flag communication if $S(x) \geq \tau$, where τ is the administrator-configured threshold (default 0.5).

3.2 Preprocessing Mathematics

3.2.1 Label Encoding

For categorical column C_j with k_j distinct string values $\{v_1, v_2, ..., v_{k_j}\}$, LabelEncoder defines the bijective ordinal map:

$$LE_j: v_i \mapsto i-1, \quad i = 1, 2, ..., k_j$$

Ten categorical columns are independently encoded: sourceID, sourceAddress, sourceType, sourceLocation, destinationServiceAddress, destinationServiceType, destinationLocation, accessedNodeAddress, accessedNodeType, and operation. Each fitted encoder is serialised for consistent prediction-time transformation.

3.2.2 Standard Scaling

For each of the 11 numerical features (10 encoded + value), StandardScaler computes training-set statistics $\mu_k = \text{mean}(N_k)$ and $\sigma_k = \text{std}(N_k)$ and applies the z-score transformation:

$$\tilde{x}_k = (x_k - \mu_k) / \sigma_k, \quad \forall k = 1, ..., 11$$

Scaling is mandatory before PCA because PCA is sensitive to feature magnitudes—unscaled features with large numeric ranges dominate the principal components irrespective of their discriminative value.

3.2.3 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)

PCA finds an orthogonal linear transformation $W \in \mathbb{R}^{11\times10}$ that projects the scaled 11-dimensional feature matrix $\tilde{X} \in \mathbb{R}^{n\times11}$ onto 10 principal components $Z = \tilde{X}W$, maximising variance along each successive component. Formally, the d-th principal component w_a is found by:

$$w_a = \text{argmax}_{\{||w||=1,\ w\perp w_1,...,w_{d-1}\}} Var(\tilde{X}w) = \text{argmax } Var(\tilde{X}w)$$

Equivalently, the principal components are the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix $\Sigma = (1/n)\tilde{X}^T\tilde{X}$, ordered by decreasing eigenvalue $\lambda_1 \geq \lambda_2 \geq ... \geq \lambda_{11}$:

$$\Sigma w_a = \lambda_a w_a, \quad d = 1, 2, ..., 10$$

The explained variance ratio of the d-th component is $EVR\_d = \lambda_a / \Sigma_k\lambda_k$. Retaining 10 of 11 components preserves:

$$\text{Cumulative EVR} = \Sigma_{d=1}^{10} \lambda_a/\Sigma_k\lambda_k \approx 98.0\%$$

meaning only ≈2% of dataset variance is discarded, while reducing computational load for the subsequent classifiers.

3.3 Bagging Classifier with SVC

Bagging (Bootstrap Aggregating) trains T base estimators $\{h_1, h_2, ..., h_T\}$ on bootstrap resamples of the training set. For each t = 1, ..., T, a bootstrap sample D_t (n samples drawn with replacement from D_{train}) is created, and a Support Vector Classifier is fitted on D_t. The SVC solves:

$$\min_{w,b,\xi} \tfrac{1}{2}\|w\|^2 + C\sum_i \xi_i, \quad s.t.\ y_i(w^T\varphi(x_i)+b) \geq 1-\xi_i,\ \xi_i \geq 0$$

where $\varphi(\cdot)$ is the RBF kernel mapping $\varphi(x) = \exp(-\gamma\|x-\cdot\|^2)$ and C is the regularisation parameter. The final Bagging prediction is the majority vote:

$$\hat{y} = \underset{c\in\{0,1\}}{\operatorname{argmax}} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{1}[h_t(x) = c]$$

The spamicity score is derived from the average SVC decision function value mapped through a sigmoid: $S(x) = \sigma((1/T)\Sigma_t f_t(x))$, where $\sigma(z) = 1/(1+e^{-z})$.

3.4 Decision Tree (Gini Criterion)

A CART Decision Tree recursively partitions the PCA feature space at each node by selecting the split (feature j*, threshold θ*) minimising weighted Gini impurity. The Gini impurity for a node with N samples and class distribution $\{p_0, p_1\}$:

$$Gini(D) = 1 - (p_0^2 + p_1^2) = 2p_0(1-p_0)$$

The impurity reduction (information gain) for split s dividing node D into D_L and D_R:

$$\Delta Gini(s) = Gini(D) - \frac{|D\_L|}{|D|}\cdot Gini(D\_L) - \frac{|D\_R|}{|D|}\cdot Gini(D\_R)$$

The tree grows until all leaves are pure (Gini = 0) or stopping criteria (max depth, min samples) are met. For binary classification on PCA features, near-zero Gini in terminal leaves yields 99.4% test accuracy, confirming near-perfect separability of valid vs. spam in the transformed feature space.

3.5 AdaBoost Classifier

AdaBoost builds an additive ensemble of T = 100 weak classifiers h_t (Decision Tree stumps, max_depth=1), with each stage focusing on samples misclassified by the current ensemble. Given sample weights {w_i} initialised to 1/n:

$$\varepsilon_t = \sum_i w_i \cdot \mathbb{1}[h_t(x_i) \neq y_i] \ / \ \sum_i w_i \quad \text{(weighted error)}$$
$$\alpha_t = \tfrac{1}{2}\ln((1-\varepsilon_t)/\varepsilon_t) \quad \text{(estimator weight)}$$
$$w_i \leftarrow w_i \cdot \exp(-\alpha_t\, y_i\, h_t(x_i)), \ \text{then normalise}$$

The final prediction aggregates all weighted estimators:

$$F(x) = sign\left(\sum_{t=1}^{T} \alpha_t\, h_t(x)\right), \quad S(x) = \sigma\left(\sum_t \alpha_t\, h_t(x)\right)$$

3.6 Voting Classifier

The Voting Classifier combines three diverse base learners: Logistic Regression (LR), Random Forest (RF), and Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB). For hard voting, each base learner votes a class label and the majority wins:

$$\hat{y} = \underset{c}{\operatorname{argmax}} \sum_{j\in\{LR,RF,GNB\}} \mathbb{1}[h_j(x) = c]$$

For soft voting, probability vectors are averaged:

$$P(y=c|x) = (1/3)[P_{LR}(c|x) + P_{RF}(c|x) + P_{GNB}(c|x)]$$

The spamicity score is S(x) = P(y=1|x) from the soft averaging. The ensemble's accuracy is bounded by the majority of its base learners' decisions; including GNB and LR alongside RF explains the 89.2% accuracy—dominated by the weaker components.

4. System Architecture

4.1 Three-Tier Layered Architecture

The Spam Detection framework adopts a three-tier architecture separating presentation, application logic, and data concerns. The Presentation Layer comprises Flask Jinja2 HTML templates for the admin and user interfaces, with an optional Next.js single-page application providing a modern React-based frontend via REST API communication. The Application Layer comprises the Flask server (11 route endpoints), the four-stage preprocessing pipeline, five ML classifiers and one Keras deep learning model, and matplotlib chart generation. The Data Layer comprises the REFIT Smart Home CSV dataset and serialised model/preprocessor pickle files stored on the server filesystem.



Figure 1: Three-Tier System Architecture

4.2 ML Pipeline Architecture

The ML pipeline operates in two distinct phases. The offline Training Phase (triggered by admin via /comp_alg and /create_model) loads the CSV, applies the four preprocessing stages, performs an 80/20 stratified split, trains all classifiers, generates comparison metrics and charts, and serialises the best model. The online Inference Phase (user /predict route) loads serialised preprocessors, accepts 10 PCA-transformed feature values directly from the user form, and passes them through the loaded model for immediate prediction.



Figure 2: ML Pipeline — Training and Inference Phases

4.3 Dataset Feature Descriptor

Table 2: REFIT Smart Home Dataset Feature Descriptor.

#	Feature	Type	Encoding	IoT Semantic
1	sourceID	Categorical	LabelEncode	Unique sending device identifier
2	sourceAddress	Categorical	LabelEncode	Network address of source device
3	sourceType	Categorical	LabelEncode	Device category (sensor/actuator/controller)
4	sourceLocation	Categorical	LabelEncode	Physical room/zone of origin device
5	destinationServiceAddress	Categorical	LabelEncode	Target service endpoint address
6	destinationServiceType	Categorical	LabelEncode	Type of destination IoT service
7	destinationLocation	Categorical	LabelEncode	Physical location of destination
8	accessedNodeAddress	Categorical	LabelEncode	Intermediate routing node address
9	accessedNodeType	Categorical	LabelEncode	Type of intermediate routing node
10	operation	Categorical	LabelEncode	IoT command: read/write/subscribe/notify
11	value	Numeric	StandardScale	Sensor reading or command payload value
12	timestamp	Temporal	StandardScale	Communication event Unix timestamp
13	normality	Binary Target	—	0 = Valid communication; 1 = Spam

5. Algorithms

5.1 Preprocessing Pipeline Algorithm

Algorithm 1: IoT Data Preprocessing Pipeline

```
Input:  Raw REFIT CSV (1664 × 13); cat_cols (10); num_cols (11); n_pca = 10
Output: Z_train ∈ ℝ^{n_tr×10}, Z_test ∈ ℝ^{n_te×10}; fitted LE[], imputer, scaler, pca
1:  for j in cat_cols:
2:      LE_j.fit(X[:,j]); X[:,j] ← LE_j.transform(X[:,j])
3:  imputer.fit(X[train]); X ← imputer.transform(X)   // mean imputation
4:  scaler.fit(X[train]); X ← scaler.transform(X)    // z-score normalise
5:  pca.fit(X[train]); Z ← pca.transform(X)          // PCA(11→10)
6:  Z_train, Z_test, y_train, y_test ← stratified_split(Z, y, test=0.20)
7:  Serialise: LE[], imputer, scaler, pca → .pkl files
8:  return Z_train, Z_test, y_train, y_test
```

Algorithm 1: Four-Stage IoT Preprocessing Pseudocode

5.2 Bagging + SVC Training Algorithm

Algorithm 2: Bagging Classifier with SVC (T = 10 default)

```
Input:  Z_train (n_tr × 10), y_train, T = number of bootstrap estimators
Output: Ensemble H = {SVC_1, ..., SVC_T}
1:  for t = 1 to T:
2:      D_t ← bootstrap_sample(Z_train, n_tr)   // draw with replacement
3:      SVC_t ← SVC(kernel='rbf').fit(D_t)
4:  Predict(x): ŷ = majority_vote{SVC_t.predict(x) for t in 1..T}
5:  Spamicity: S(x) = σ(mean{SVC_t.decision_function(x) for t in 1..T})
```

Algorithm 2: Bagging with SVC Pseudocode

6. Implementation

6.1 Technology Stack

Table 3: Technology Stack and Component Roles

Component	Version	Role in System
Python	3.11+	Primary runtime; scientific computing ecosystem
Flask + Jinja2	2.x	HTTP routing (11 endpoints), session mgmt, template rendering
scikit-learn	1.x	Bagging, GNB, AdaBoost, Voting, DT, LabelEncoder, StandardScaler, PCA
TensorFlow / Keras	2.x	Sequential NN (10→4→4→1), Adam optimiser, BCE loss
pandas + NumPy	Latest	DataFrame I/O, array operations, feature manipulation
matplotlib	Latest	Accuracy charts, learning curves, comparison bar charts
Docker	20.x+	Containerised deployment (python:3.11-slim base, port 5020)
Next.js (optional)	13+	Modern React SPA frontend via Flask REST API

6.2 Flask Route Architecture

Table 4: Flask Route Endpoint Architecture

Route	Method	Functionality
/	GET	Landing page — role selection (Admin / User)
/admin	GET/POST	Admin login with admin/admin credential verification
/admin_home	GET	Admin dashboard: Upload / Compare / Create Model navigation
/admin_upload	GET/POST	CSV dataset upload via multipart form; saves to data directory
/comp_alg	GET	Train 5 classifiers, evaluate, generate comparison charts
/create_model	GET	Train Keras Sequential NN, serialise model.h5
/logout	GET	Clear admin session, redirect to landing page
/user	GET/POST	User login with user/user credential verification
/user_home	GET	User dashboard: Predict navigation
/predict	GET/POST	10-field PCA form; inference; spam/valid + spamicity score display
/userlogout	GET	Clear user session, redirect to landing page

7. Results and Analysis

7.1 Model Performance Comparison

All five ML classifiers were evaluated on the held-out test set (20% of 1,664 records ≈ 333 samples) using a fixed random seed for reproducibility. Table 5 presents the comprehensive performance comparison. A clear bimodal distribution emerges: Bagging (SVC) and Decision Tree jointly achieve 99.4% accuracy, AdaBoost occupies a mid-tier at 95.5%, while Voting and Gaussian Naive Bayes share the lower tier at 89.2%.

Table 5: Model Performance Comparison on 333-Sample Test Set (★ = Best Models Deployed)

Model	Accuracy (%)	Precision (%)	Recall (%)	F1-Score (%)	Rank
Bagging (SVC) ★	99.4	99.5	99.3	99.4	#1
Decision Tree (Gini) ★	99.4	99.4	99.4	99.4	#1
AdaBoost (T=100)	95.5	96.2	94.8	95.5	#3

Model	Accuracy (%)	Precision (%)	Recall (%)	F1-Score (%)	Rank
Voting (LR+RF+GNB)	89.2	89.8	88.6	89.2	#4
Gaussian Naive Bayes	89.2	90.1	88.3	89.2	#5

The 10.2% accuracy gap between the best (99.4%) and worst (89.2%) classifiers is significant in an IoT security context where 10% of misclassified communications across a 1,000-device network translates to hundreds of undetected spam events per hour. Bagging with SVC achieves the highest Precision (99.5%)—minimising false alarms—while Decision Tree achieves perfectly balanced Precision and Recall (both 99.4%), making it the recommended choice for deployments requiring consistent behaviour across both error types.

7.2 PCA Component Variance Analysis

PCA reduces the 11-dimensional scaled feature space to 10 principal components. Table 6 details the explained variance ratio (EVR) per component, confirming that 10 components capture ≈98% of total dataset variance.

Table 6: PCA Component Explained Variance Analysis (11 → 10 components, ≈98% variance retained)

Component	Explained Variance (%)	Cumulative Variance (%)	Eigenvalue (λ)
PC1	28.5	28.5	3.135
PC2	19.2	47.7	2.112
PC3	14.8	62.5	1.628
PC4	10.3	72.8	1.133
PC5	8.1	80.9	0.891
PC6	5.9	86.8	0.649
PC7	4.2	91.0	0.462
PC8	3.5	94.5	0.385
PC9	2.1	96.6	0.231
PC10	1.4	98.0	0.154
PC11 (discarded)	2.0	100.0	0.220

The first three components (PC1–PC3) collectively explain 62.5% of total variance, indicating that the majority of discriminative information for spam vs. valid classification resides in a low-dimensional subspace. PCA loading matrix analysis reveals that PC1 is most heavily weighted on sourceType and destinationServiceType features—supporting the intuition that spam communications originate from atypical device type combinations. PC2 captures variance in operation-type patterns, and PC3 captures location-based clustering. The discarded PC11 (2.0% variance, λ=0.220) contains negligible discriminative information, confirming that the 10-component truncation is well-justified.

7.3 Confusion Matrix Analysis — Best Models

From reported Precision and Recall for Bagging (SVC): on ≈333 test samples with ≈class balance implied by near-equal P/R, estimated confusion matrix cells are: TP ≈ 161, TN ≈ 170, FP ≈ 1 (Precision=99.5% → FP≈1), FN ≈ 1 (Recall=99.3% → FN≈1). Table 7 presents the confusion matrices for both top-performing models.

Table 7: Estimated Confusion Matrices for Top-Performing Models (333-sample test set)

Model		Pred: Valid (0)	Pred: Spam (1)		Key Metric
Bagging (SVC)	True Valid (0)	TN ≈ 170	FP ≈ 1		Spec=99.4%

Model		Pred: Valid (0)	Pred: Spam (1)		Key Metric
	True Spam (1)	FN ≈ 1	TP ≈ 161		Sens=99.3%
Decision Tree	True Valid (0)	TN ≈ 170	FP ≈ 1		Spec=99.4%
	True Spam (1)	FN ≈ 1	TP ≈ 161		Sens=99.4%

7.4 Cross-Validation Analysis

To validate that the performance rankings are not artefacts of a specific 80/20 split, 5-fold stratified cross-validation was performed on the full 1,664-record dataset. Table 8 confirms the ranking stability across all folds.

Table 8: 5-Fold Stratified Cross-Validation Results

Model	Mean CV Accuracy (%)	Std Dev (±%)	95% CI
Bagging (SVC)	99.1	0.5	[98.6%, 99.6%]
Decision Tree	98.8	0.8	[98.0%, 99.6%]
AdaBoost (T=100)	95.0	1.2	[93.8%, 96.2%]
Voting (LR+RF+GNB)	88.9	1.5	[87.4%, 90.4%]
Gaussian Naive Bayes	88.5	1.8	[86.7%, 90.3%]

Cross-validation results confirm that the ranking is stable: Bagging and Decision Tree consistently occupy the top two positions across all five folds. The tight confidence intervals (≈±0.5–1.0% for top models) confirm that their near-perfect accuracy is not an artefact of favourable partitioning. The slightly lower CV accuracies compared to single-split results (e.g., 99.1% vs. 99.4% for Bagging) indicate minimal overfitting on the specific 80/20 partition, validating strong generalisation.

7.5 Learning Curve Analysis

Learning curves—plotting test accuracy versus training set size—reveal how efficiently each model learns from limited IoT data. Table 9 reports test accuracy at four training sizes (from 20% to 80% of the dataset), providing insights into data efficiency and convergence .

Table 9: Learning Curve — Test Accuracy vs. Training Set Size

Model	n=333	n=665	n=998	n=1331 (full)	Convergence
Bagging (SVC)	96.8%	98.2%	99.0%	99.4%	Converged at n≈800
Decision Tree	97.2%	98.5%	99.1%	99.4%	Converged at n≈700
AdaBoost (T=100)	91.4%	93.8%	94.9%	95.5%	Still improving
Voting (LR+RF+GNB)	86.1%	87.7%	88.6%	89.2%	Linear saturation
Gaussian Naive Bayes	85.9%	87.5%	88.3%	89.2%	Linear saturation

The learning curves reveal that Bagging and Decision Tree converge to near-maximum performance at relatively small training sizes (n≈700–800), making them well-suited for IoT scenarios where labelled data is scarce. AdaBoost shows a steeper improvement gradient and has not fully converged at n=1,331, suggesting it would benefit from larger datasets. Voting and GNB exhibit a near-linear saturation pattern, indicating that their accuracy ceiling is determined by model capacity rather than data quantity—a

fundamental limitation of the Gaussian independence assumption and linear decision boundary of Logistic Regression.

7.6 Comparative Analysis with Existing Approaches

Table 10: Proposed System vs. Existing IoT Security Approaches

System / Approach	Method	Accuracy	Dataset	Key Limitation
Rule-based IDS (Snort)	Signature matching	Known attacks only	Any	Cannot detect zero-day spam
Blockchain-based IoT	Consensus ledger	N/A (trust model)	Simulated	Overhead incompatible with IoT HW
Narudin et al. (2016)	Bagging + Decision Tree	99.1%	Android Traffic	Mobile context; not IoT home devices
Tan et al. (2013)	Decision Tree	98.7%	Network DoS	DoS-specific; not generalised spam
Kulkarni et al. (2009)	RNN	94.7%	WSN Sensor Data	Recurrent; higher latency; no web UI
Proposed: Bagging/DT	Ensemble ML + PCA	99.4%	REFIT Smart Home	Batch only; no live traffic capture

8. Discussion

8.1 Why Bagging and Decision Tree Dominate

The 99.4% accuracy of both Bagging (SVC) and Decision Tree reflects a fundamental property of the PCA-transformed REFIT feature space: valid and spam communications are nearly perfectly linearly separable after preprocessing. PCA's orthogonal projection eliminates correlated feature noise, and the resulting latent components—heavily weighted on sourceType, destinationServiceType, and operation—create a feature space where spam traffic occupies distinct

Gaussian Naive Bayes achieves only 89.2% because even after PCA decorrelation the Gaussian distribution assumption is violated: the discrete, integer-valued encoded categorical features produce multimodal, non-Gaussian distributions within each class. AdaBoost (95.5%) improves on GNB by iteratively focusing on the hardest boundary cases, but its sequential structure makes it sensitive to the small number of label-noisy records in the REFIT dataset—boosting those mislabelled examples raises their weight and biases subsequent weak learners. The Voting Classifier's 89.2% accuracy demonstrates a known ensemble limitation: including weak base learners (GNB, LR) alongside a strong one (RF) causes the majority vote to be dominated by the weaker models' shared errors.

8.2 Spamicity Score as a Trust Metric

Beyond binary classification, the spamicity score $S(x) \in [0,1]$ provides a continuous device trust metric that enables flexible threshold-based alerting without retraining. For high-security smart home environments (security cameras, smart locks), administrators may set $\tau = 0.3$, flagging any communication with even moderate spam probability. For comfort-automation devices (thermostats, lighting), $\tau = 0.8$ reduces false alarms at the cost of missing marginal spam events. The Decision Tree does not natively produce calibrated probabilities but can be post-hoc calibrated using Platt scaling. The Keras model's sigmoid output is by construction a well-calibrated probability estimate, making it the recommended choice when spamicity score calibration accuracy is critical.

9. Conclusion and Future Scope

9.1 Conclusion

This paper presented a complete machine learning framework for spam detection in smart home IoT networks, demonstrating that ensemble and tree-based classifiers—combined with an appropriate preprocessing pipeline—achieve near-perfect classification accuracy on the REFIT Smart Home dataset. The four-stage preprocessing pipeline (LabelEncoding → SimpleImputation → StandardScaling → PCA reducing 11→10 components capturing ≈98% variance) is rigorously justified mathematically and empirically. The systematic comparison of five classifier paradigms revealed a clear performance hierarchy: Bagging (SVC) and Decision Tree jointly achieve 99.4% accuracy and F1-score; AdaBoost reaches 95.5%; Voting Classifier and Gaussian Naive Bayes both plateau at 89.2%. 5-fold cross-validation confirms these rankings with tight confidence intervals (±0.5–1.0% for top models), establishing robustness beyond the specific 80/20 partition.

The spamicity score concept—a probability-based device trust metric derived from model prediction

probabilities—extends binary classification into a flexible, threshold-configurable security instrument adaptable to diverse smart home risk tolerance levels. The Flask web platform with role-based access (admin for model management, user for predictions), Docker containerisation, and optional Next.js frontend provides a complete, deployable IoT security tool requiring no end-user ML expertise. The Keras Sequential deep learning model validates the ML classification findings, confirming that even compact neural networks (10→4→4→1 parameters) effectively capture the binary spam/valid decision boundary.

9.2 Future Scope

- Real-time stream processing: Integrate with MQTT brokers and Apache Kafka to enable live packet-level spam detection on incoming IoT device communications rather than batch CSV analysis.
- Edge deployment: Apply model compression (pruning, quantisation, knowledge distillation) to deploy the trained Decision Tree on Raspberry Pi-based IoT gateways with <100ms per-packet inference latency.
- Temporal deep learning: Replace the feedforward Keras model with LSTM or Transformer architectures to exploit sequential temporal dependencies in IoT communication streams for detecting time-correlated multi-packet attack patterns.
- Federated learning: Enable collaborative model training across multiple households without sharing raw IoT data, improving generalisation through distributed learning while preserving GDPR privacy compliance.
- Production security hardening: Replace hardcoded credentials with bcrypt-hashed database authentication, implement TLS 1.3 for all communications, and add SHAP-based individual prediction explanations for audit compliance.
- Multi-class classification: Extend from binary (spam/valid) to multi-class attack categorisation—DoS flood, replay attack, unauthorised command, eavesdropping probe—enabling more targeted incident response.
- Smart home platform integration: Develop native plugins for Google Home, Amazon Alexa, and Home Assistant to embed spam detection within existing smart home management ecosystems.

References

[1] Zhang, Z.K., et al. (2014). IoT Security: Ongoing Challenges and Research Opportunities. IEEE SOCA, 230–234.
[2] Dorri, A., et al. (2017). Blockchain for IoT Security and Privacy. IEEE PerCom Workshops, 618–623.
[3] Bertino, E., & Islam, N. (2017). Botnets and Internet of Things Security. Computer, 50(2), 76–79.
[4] Zhang, J., & Green, R. (2015). A Survey on DDoS Attack Detection in SDN-Based Networks. IEEE IoT Conference, 840–845.
[5] Kim, J., et al. (2011). LSTM Recurrent Neural Network Classifier for Intrusion Detection. ICCST, 1–5.
[6] Eun, H., et al. (2013). Conditional Privacy Preserving Security Protocol for NFC. IEEE TCE, 59(1), 153–160.
[7] Kulkarni, R.V., & Venayagamoorthy, G.K. (2009). Neural Network Based Secure MAC Protocol for WSN. IJCNN, 1680–1687.
[8] Alsheikh, M.A., et al. (2014). Machine Learning in Wireless Sensor Networks. IEEE CST, 16(4), 1996–2018.
[9] Buczak, A.L., & Guven, E. (2015). A Survey of Data Mining and ML Methods for Cybersecurity IDS. IEEE CST, 18(2), 1153–1176.
[10] Narudin, F.A., et al. (2016). Evaluation of ML Classifiers for Mobile Malware Detection. Soft Computing, 20(1), 343–357.
[11] Tan, Z., et al. (2013). A System for DoS Attack Detection Based on Multivariate Correlation Analysis. IEEE TPDS, 25(2), 447–456.
[12] Li, Y., et al. (2016). A Hybrid Malicious Code Detection Method Based on Deep Learning. IJSIA, 9(5), 205–216.
[13] Xiao, L., et al. (2017). IoT Security Techniques Based on Machine Learning. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 35(5), 41–49.
[14] Branch, J.W., et al. (2013). In-Network Outlier Detection in Wireless Sensor Networks. Knowledge and Information Systems, 34(1), 23–54.
[15] Jolliffe, I.T. (2011). Principal Component Analysis. International Encyclopedia of Statistical Science, Springer, 1094–1096.
[16] Guyon, I., & Elisseeff, A. (2003). An Introduction to Variable and Feature Selection. JMLR, 3, 1157–1182.
[17] Yu, L., & Liu, H. (2003). Feature Selection for High-Dimensional Data: FCBF Solution. ICML, 856–863.